“Unsustainable losses in the medium and long term”: will Russia run out of tanks and armored vehicles in Ukraine?

Dominant on the battlefield for 18 months now , Russia is reportedly approaching possible negotiations for a ceasefire from a position of strength. A major supporter of Ukraine since the start of the war, the United States, under the leadership of Donald Trump, now seems ready to make significant concessions to end the conflict at all costs . By denigrating Volodymyr Zelensky, whom he ostensibly keeps at a distance , as well as the Europeans , the American president is making a sudden rapprochement with Russia that could bury hopes of a just peace. Especially since on the ground, Moscow's troops are advancing slowly but inexorably. However, today's military reality is not necessarily that of tomorrow.

"Russia will likely face several material, human and economic constraints in the next 12 to 18 months" that could rebalance the balance of power, the American think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) underlines in a recent note . Because for several months now, Moscow has shifted into a phase of attrition, which aims to wear down the Ukrainian army, but which is not without consequences for its own army. "If the rate of losses of Russian forces in Ukraine continues at the current rate, the Kremlin's ability to maintain its war effort will be put under pressure in the medium and long term," predicts the institute, which has been analyzing the conflict since its beginnings. Both in its consumption of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems and munitions as well as men and manpower.

By 2026, Russia could thus face "unsustainable losses in the medium and long term" of tanks and armored vehicles, estimates the ISW. The cost in this area has been colossal since the start of the war. According to the Oryx platform , which records the losses of both sides based on visual evidence, Moscow has lost at least 11,908 armored vehicles since February 24, 2022, including 3,773 tanks. The Ukrainian general staff even estimates having destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 armored vehicles and 13,050 artillery systems in 2024 alone. Less optimistic, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank, mentions figures of 1,400 tanks, 3,700 armored vehicles and 1,326 artillery systems (towed or self-propelled) for 2024.

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According to the ISW, "the Russian defense industrial base cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at a rate that can compensate for current losses." The Uralvagonzavod plant, which produces Russia's new tanks, has a production rate that is estimated to range from 60 to 240 per year. The arms company is also capable of refurbishing about eight tanks per month, while three other repair plants have the capacity to refurbish 17 tanks per month. Even in the most optimistic scenarios, Russia does not produce and repair as many tanks as it loses. The same goes for armored vehicles, which Russia can produce at a rate of 200 per year, and for artillery systems, which are limited to 50 per year due to a lack of sufficient factories.

Since the beginning of the war, Russia has been compensating for its production by drawing on its reserves of Soviet-era tanks and artillery systems. But here too, “this resource is limited and is approaching the point of diminishing availability,” the ISW estimates. The IISS estimates that Russia will have refurbished more than 1,500 tanks and 2,800 armored vehicles from that period by 2024, which largely offsets the estimated annual battlefield losses. But stocks are running low: according to various open-source estimates, Moscow has only 47% of its pre-war tank reserves and around 50% of its armor reserves. “Some analysts predict that Russia will run out of Soviet equipment by the end of 2025 or early 2026,” the ISW writes.

In addition, the IISS also predicts that Russia will soon run out of spare parts to refurbish tanks and armored vehicles. Added to this could be a possible shortage of ammunition, although this prospect, often put forward since the beginning of the war, has so far never been verified. NATO estimates that Russia produces 250,000 artillery shells per month, as reported by CNN in March 2024. A colossal figure, three times higher than American and European production. But the Russian army is greedy for shells: the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimates that Russia uses 300,000 monthly munitions in Ukraine, with an average of 10,000 rounds per day. Moscow has therefore had to rely on its North Korean ally to supplement its stock. Although the Kim Jong-un regime has sent nearly nine million shells to Russia, it is unclear how long these supplies will be able to compensate for Russian shortfalls.

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The other limit is human: "Russia's current monthly recruitment rate is either just equal to or slightly lower than the monthly casualty rate," the ISW points out. Americans and British estimate this rate at between 36,000 and 42,000 per month, or between 432,000 and 504,000 per year, with a peak of 48,670 deaths in December 2024, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. However, the vice-president of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, indicated at the end of December that Moscow had recruited 440,000 soldiers in 2024. And the Russian recruitment rate could well be "declining," according to the ISW, as the salary increase promised by the Russian Ministry of Defense tends to prove. Another indicator in this sense: the recent sending of 12,000 North Korean soldiers to the front .

Added to this are several economic factors. The ISW notes the "steady erosion of the Russian sovereign wealth fund" and "rising Russian inflation," which recently reached 10%, according to Vladimir Putin, but probably double that according to American and European estimates. "The Central Bank has also raised interest rates to 21%, the highest since 2003," the think tank points out. In addition, "labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors are limiting Russian economic growth and defense industrial production."

All of these elements, if exploited by Ukraine’s allies, could become powerful levers in the perspective of future negotiations. “Western military aid would help Ukrainian forces better defend their positions, slow Russian advances and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian army,” predicts the ISW. “Higher Russian attrition rates, disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, could jeopardize Putin’s efforts.” And push him to make greater concessions when he takes his place at the negotiating table. “Ukraine needs a European surge, in the face of a Russia that has exhausted itself in its attrition process,” confirms Stéphane Audrand, a seasoned observer of the conflict . “This would allow the country to impose much better conditions on the battlefield.”

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It is obviously not a question here of "destroying the Russian army, which remains powerful in defense" . But rather of "stabilizing a more tenable front for Ukraine" , analyzes the international risk consultant. Even abandoned by the United States, Europe "still has large fleets of old equipment that it could revalue for Ukraine" , he adds. The logistical challenges that Russia will face in 2025 could thus be used as a lever to obtain a better peace for Ukraine.